The objective of Japanese space policy, since its beginning, was to "catch-up" with advanced spacefaring countries. However, this "catching up" strategy is now facing with a lot of difficulties, due to the downturn of economy and progress of Japanese technology. In these circumstances, Japanese space community realized the necessity for changing its national space strategy. In 2005, some Japanese powerful politicians issued a report on constructing national space strategy which demanded the government to establish new decision-making structure. These efforts are focusing the need for Japanese space to shift the focus of policy from technological development to application.
Introduction
Japanese space policy is now in a transition. By the time of publication of this article, a bill might have been submitted to the Diet for establishing the "Basic Law of Space Activities", submitted by members of the Diet 1 . This is the first time since the late-1960s that Japanese politicians took action for intervening space policy-making. This law not only aims for stimulating space activities in Japan, but for transforming the normative base of Japanese space policy-making from R&D oriented policy to user-driven policy. Furthermore, it challenges the normative assumption of "exclusively peaceful purpose" clause in the Diet resolution in 1969. These aims and challenges are indeed a significant change from the past experience of Japanese space policy-making.
It is the task of this paper to explore why such a change happened in Japan. Why, in a sudden, politicians became interested in committing themselves in space policy? What made them changed their minds? How is this transformation accepted by traditionally dominating space actors such as JAXA? What would be the consequences if the Basic Law passed the Diet? And, after all, does this Basic Law transform Japanese space policy-making process? In answering these ques-fact, almost all non-R&D satellites were procured from US manufacturers since then 6 . However, Japanese companies kept calm over this agreement which may have devastating effect on their business, because most of satellite manufacturers in Japan were producers of super computers and electronic goods. It was also them who would have suffered if the US government had imposed sanctions. Putting it simply, they preferred supercomputer over satellites.
As a result of this agreement, NASDA had to focus on R&D satellite which was the only allowed activity for the government to offer contracts to Japanese industry. The industry, on the other hand, was not extremely enthusiastic for improving its competitiveness, largely because they considered that the space business was not commercially profitable, and it was sufficient to receive R&D contracts from NASDA for its survival. Furthermore, the rationale to keep their space business was to contribute Japanese technological development for strengthening the position of Japan in international arena, thus, there were little incentives for Japanese industry to take risks for commercialization of space or to reduce costs and improve its efficiency.
Changing Economic and Administrative Circumstances
Concerns over government's budget deficit and inefficiency of bureaucracy has been a subject of political discussion since mid-1990s. Due to the long-term recession, tax revenue continuously declined while inefficient bureaucratic expenditure was in a trend of increase. Since the beginning of 1990s, government bond issue has increased dramatically for stimulating stagnated economy. In 1994, the cumulated debts exceeded 200 trillion yen (about $1.81 trillion), which is beyond the total of debt of third world countries. In 1998, it doubled to 427 trillion yen (about $3.81 trillion), and currently in 2006, it is 827 trillion yen (about $7.51 trillion) 7 . This explosive increase of public debt made Japanese government on the verge of bankruptcy. The government was forced to take action to reduce government spending and revitalise the economy. In 1996,
Prime Minister Hashimoto initiated a project to rationalise ministerial structure and to reduce the number of civil servants. Hashimoto who had a keen awareness of the budgetary problem realised that it was time to shift towards "small and efficient government". This period also coincided with strong criticism against corruption, opaque decision-making process, and favouritism toward big business was mounting. Thus, for avoiding public criticism and decreasing government spending, the discussion for administrative reform began. Agency.
The merger of MoE and STA, the supervising ministries of NASDA and ISAS respectively, raised expectation in space policy community that this would end the long-standing division within the Japanese space policy and would induce a synergy effect. However, the consequence of this merger increased the confusion of the policy-making process. Because of the principle of exchanging personnel between two ministries, the head of space policy division of MEXT was designated as a seat of former education bureaucrat. The center of space policy-making in the MEXT was occupied by those who have experience in academic grant, exchange student affairs and elementary school education. Even before the merger, the head of the division was occupied by non-space expert, but at least the head had some background knowledge in the fields of science and technology. The administrative reform seemingly increased the efficiency, but in reality, it created confusion in space policy-making.
Speaking of the confusion of space policy-making, the administrative reform also influenced the position of the highest level of decision-making. SAC, once the central inter-ministry coordinating body and reporting directly to the Prime Minister, became much smaller organisation only responsible for the JAXA matters (though it deals with most of the space activity in Japan).
Currently no inter-ministerial coordination for space activities exists. On the other hand, CSTP was created to coordinate S&T policy independently from ministries. Although the CSTP is much higher organisation in bureaucratic hierarchy, it does not have the power to formulate budget line.
It is only an advisory council for the Prime Minister. The SAC, on the other hand, still maintains the power to decide how much fund should be allocated to which programs. However, since SAC became only a committee under MEXT, the decision of SAC is no longer the final one as it should be channelled through MEXT for further negotiation with the Ministry of Treasury. The importance of SAC is diminished further because the chairman is no longer the Secretary of State for Science and Technology, but it is chaired by someone outside space community, who has less influence and knowledge about the space activities. The confusion in the decision-making process thus continues.
In addition to the confusion in decision-making process, there are severe financial constraints on Japanese space policy. Although the nominal space budget does maintain a flat line at 200 billion Yen (about $1.8 billion) for the last few years, the real money which is spent on Japanese space programmes is seriously dropping. This lack of funding was not only due to the budgetary constraints, but also from the lower priority and political attention from the government. With the consecutive failures (ADEOS-2, Planet-B, and H-IIA with two IGS satellites) in early 2000s, Japanese government began to question whether the funding for space development was efficiently used to bring successful missions. The general trend of shrinking budget may not change for a while.
Shocks in Post-Cold War Period
But most importantly, the post-Cold War period has brought new circumstances to Japanese space strategy. First of all, the changes of security environment have made it difficult for Japan to continue its pacifist policy. During the Cold War, there was a mutual interest between the governments of Japan and the United States. For the US, it was important to have Japan as a front line defense towards the Soviet and Communist threat to Pacific Ocean. For Japan, the alliance with the US was the core of its pacifist concept for not having any offensive military forces. Without US forces present in Japan, it would only be able to defend when the hostile action taken place in its territory and not be able to take any counter-measure in enemy's territory.
However, the situation in the post-Cold War period is somewhat different from the previous period. The threat of Communism has dramatically reduced, and the reasons for stationing US troops in Japan became also ambiguous. Although the US still maintained a need for stationing in Japan as a forward deployment base, it does no longer imperative to protect Japan in the name of alliance. Thus, the US government shifted its policy to "share more burdens" with Japanese government, in other words, Japan should contribute more for the actions of the United States for the security matters. The consequence of this was Japanese participation in War on Terror, particularly deployment of naval forces to support US-led operation in Afghanistan and ground troops in Iraq.
Through these operations, Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) realized the important technological gap for its own operations. Since SDF was restricted from developing and operating its own space capabilities, it had to rely on commercial satellite communication and commercial imagery services. Because in the past, SDF was not supposed to go beyond its borders, so there was no need for communication in long distance or collecting imagery of other countries other than its neighbours. Furthermore, through these operations, SDF realized that there is a wide gap of military technology between Japan and the United States forces, particularly with fast-developing US military transformation and Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Given the increasing possibility of Japan's sharing security burden and joint operation with US forces, SDF and Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) recognized the importance of developing space capability for narrowing the gap.
However, that was not the end of the story. The perception of Japanese people on security matters has dramatically changed by two events. First, the imminent threat of North Korea became visible when the Taepodong flew over Japanese territory in 1998. It was a big change of the policy paradigm. This incident put Japanese public as well as policy community in a panic mode.
There was a strong demand to do something for avoiding North Korean to launch missiles towards Japan and protect our homeland. Thus, immediately after the Taepodong launch, the government made a decision to start a new satellite program, Information Gathering Satellite (IGS).
Nevertheless, it was seriously constrained by the existing legal interpretation. Although it was clear that the purpose of IGS was to monitor military activities of possible threats such as North Korea, but it was disguised as a "multi-purpose" (note: it was even difficult to mention "dual-use" because it implies the possibility of the participation of JDA) satellite, which also serves for civilian purpose.
However, because of the 1990 accord with the United States for satellite procurement, the IGS as a civilian non R&D satellite should be placed under open procurement procedure. This has put Japanese government in a serious dilemma. If the government wants to develop IGS as multi-purpose satellite, the specification of satellite has to be open to public, but it cannot grant a defense satellite status (which is assumed to be exempted from 1990 Accord on satellite procurement) due to the Diet resolution.
The solution of this dilemma came from a careful legal interpretation. The government placed the control of the satellite not under JDA, but Cabinet Secretariat, a small office with national intelligence gathering mission and crisis management functions. So, the IGS was formally designed as a "crisis management satellite" with both civilian and military purposes 8 .
This incident provided a wide-ranging understanding among politicians that the legal constraints of "exclusively peaceful purpose" resolution was too strict to have a room for maneuver, and under the changing security environment in the post-Cold War period, it is non-sense to maintain such a rigid pacifist rules. ties and institutional framework for structuring space policy-making process more coherent with three new settings. First, the report proposes that the government should create a ministerial post with a portfolio of space. This new ministerial post will be the center for strategic thinking and planning of space. The report underlines that the source of the problems of Japanese space policy is its concentration on developing new technology and lack of attention to the users' needs and demands, so it claims that the new minister for space shall make efforts to bring the user ministries in the process of policy-making for space, and aggregate the user needs which should be reflected to the R&D program. Also the minister shall involve the defense and foreign policy authorities to use space assets for advancing Japanese space capability for security and foreign policy under current constitutional framework.
Second, the report also demands the government to establish a new forum of space user Third, this report suggests that the political community, including members of Consultation Group, should initiate the new discussion for the interpretation of the "exclusively peaceful purpose" resolution. Because this resolution was taken at the legislative body, the Diet, and it binds the action of the executive branch of the government. So, the decision to change the interpretation of the resolution should come from the Diet members. As discussed above, the political interest in space policy was not high for so many years, and there was no initiative from the Diet members for changing this resolution.
Furthermore, the report urged the government to take serious consideration for using space for achieving diplomatic objectives. Among the members of the Consultation Group, there was a strong concern about the development of Chinese space program. Of course, the members were impressed by the successful manned-space program, but their concern was not about the competition in the manned-space capability or space race for the Moon. Instead, their attention was paid to the recent development of Chinese action towards other Asian countries. In 2005, Chinese government concluded the signing of the establishing agreement for APSCO 11 (Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation for international cooperation, it would lose the advantage of Japan being the leader in this region, and thus, they demanded the government to take serious consideration for coordinating Japanese foreign policy and APRSAF activities.
With these concerns in mind, the report of the Consultation Group was received well by the members of LDP and the government. The Kawamura's initiative paved the way for Japan to transform its space policy-making process.
For Establishing the Basic Law
Kawamura's ambition did not stop by publishing this report. He also brought this report The first impression of this Basic Law is that it is a straight reflection of Kawamura Consultation Group report. It will set up new Minister for Space and Space Development Headquarters (a forum of user ministries with strong authority). The Minister for Space would be a "specially designated" minister who will not be in charge of the management of the ministry but to reside in the Cabinet Office for coordinating policies of different ministries. The Headquarters will be composed by all the ministers and some specially appointed members from academia and industry. Although this is an ambitious challenge, concerning the conservative attitude of the government towards any reform, there are hopes that these new institutions would provide positive force for more political attention and dynamics in space activities. However, one concern remains about the fiscal competency of this new Minister for Space. The Basic Law avoided to define who will draft the budget proposal and whether the Headquarters would have the power to formulate budget. Currently, the space budget is defined by the proposals from different ministries. The majority of the budget goes to MEXT/JAXA, some portion goes to Cabinet Secretariat for IGS, and the rest splits into different ministries for utilization of space assets. As long as this budgetary structure remains, it would be difficult for the Minister for Space and Headquarters to take initiatives for user-driven programs because the user ministries would be reluctant to spare their limited budget, and MEXT would refuse to reallocate its own budget. However, one member of SCSD suggested that the The second point of the Basic Law is the question of security. As discussed above, the "exclusively peaceful purpose" resolution was under pressure in changing security environment around Japan in the post-Cold War period. Kawamura Consultation Group discussed this matter extensively, but did not give conclusive position on how to deal with the resolution. But in SCSD with a lot of members interested in security issues, many politicians fiercely insisted that the interpretation should be changed. Thus, the SCSD set up a sub-committee to discuss the possible scenario for changing the resolution and it came up with an idea to set out the security objective in the Basic Law. Obviously, Law is more binding than resolution. So, SCSD finally concluded that the one of the objectives of the Basic Law is "to promote the security of our homeland and people by contributing Japanese space capability to the international security arrangement". The SCSD, particularly Kawamura as an acting chairman of the Committee, strongly emphasized that this change of interpretation does not aim for aggressive use of space, i.e. enhancing Japanese military capability for invasion or using military forces to solve international disputes. Instead, this Basic Law confirms the principle of the Article 9 of the Constitution. The space assets will be used for crisis management and disaster monitoring in Asian region or peacekeeping missions in distant territories. 17 Informal interview with the member of SCSD, under the condition of anonymity (December 22, 2006) .
It implies that Japan might have early warning satellite for MD which also falls into a category of self-defense. Thus, the Basic Law is designed to strengthen Japanese role in dispute settlement and crisis management with a peaceful means. It only tries to change the interpretation of the Diet resolution which prevented any use of space assets by military authority.
The third point of the Basic Law is about "industrialization" of space industry. Since 1990 when the Accord with the United States for satellite procurement entered into force, Japanese satellite industry lost its opportunity to improve international competitiveness through government programs. During the period of commercialization in the late-1990s, Japanese industry was not able to enter into the booming market (in retrospect, it might have limited the damage from the downturn of the market though). Nevertheless, long history of concentrating on R&D and technological development has made Japanese industry entirely relying on the government R&D funding, which was decreasing due to the fiscal constraints. Furthermore, because of the nature of government-funded R&D projects, Japanese industry was not concentrated on improving international competitiveness, i.e. improving reliability, reducing costs and meeting with deadlines. If Japanese industry continues to depend on government procurement, Japanese industrial and technological capability will inevitably face the cul-de-sac. The weakening of Japanese industrial base would undermine its capacity to develop space system for security purposes. Thus, the Basic Law urged the government as well as the industry to steer up its effort of "industrialization", i.e. strengthening industrial capability and autonomous business foundation from public budget. In order to achieve this objective, the Basic Law argues to set up a policy of "anchor tenancy", which borrows the idea of Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) exercised in Europe. Particularly, the experience of Private Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme of SKYNET 5, British military communication satellite, was considered as an ideal model. The PFI scheme would be able to avoid infringement with 1990 Accord since it is not a pure "public procurement" as such. The procuring body is not the government agency but private enterprise, and the government only plays the role of principal customer. The private enterprise would have stable income from government user fee, but it would endeavor market opportunity if the satellite is not used by the government. In fact, this scheme was employed in the case of QZSS 18 , but as discussed above, it was unsuccessful because of the turmoil in the government. So the SCSD believed that if the Minister for Space takes the initiative and the Headquarters functions properly, the government can offer stable "anchor tenancy" to the private enterprise, and the "industrialization" would be successful.
Although the Basic Law focuses extensively on the user-side of space projects, it does not neglect the importance of R&D. However, its interest in R&D is not based on the concept of technological "catch-up", but on the originality and national prestige. fascinate the public and international space community would serve better for Japan.
Conclusion
After analyzing the objectives and aims of the Basic Law, the obvious questions should be asked: Is this really possible? Does anyone, particularly those who benefited from the old regime, object to this proposal? Would user ministries happily cooperate with the new Minister for Space, particularly Japanese Defense Agency which developed a habit of not using space? Does industry change from comfortable dependence on the government budget to taking business risks?
Of course, changing normative foundation of policy-making is not easy. It is always a political struggle. MEXT and JAXA might be the strongest opposition since they might lose the monopoly situation of space policy-making. In response to these changes, JAXA began to shift its policy focus from R&D to more user-oriented programs in satellite programs for providing impression that it is adopting the new policy objectives, but at the same time, JAXA strongly claims that Japan is still behind other countries and "catching up" is needed. On the other hand, JDA, which became the Ministry of Defense in January 2007, set up a new "Strategy Planning Office" which includes space as one of the pillar of strategic policy 19 . Industry might be reluctant to be autonomous from the government budget, but it realized that the government expenditure is in decline with or without Basic Law.
If Japanese space policy-making process continues as it is today, the space community would be in jeopardy. Although Japanese economy is in recovery, space budget would unlikely increase under any circumstance because the huge government deficit and debt would not be resolved in foreseeable future. International competitiveness of space industry needs to be improved in order to sustain sufficient level of technological and industrial base. And most of all, the "exclusively peaceful purpose" resolution should be redefined in uncertain security condition around Japan. The world has changed from Cold War structure, and it is the time for Japan to transform its space policy.
